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PROVISIONAL THOUGHTS ON LIMITATIONS TO THE RIGHT TO 
PROCREATE 
JA Robinson 
Freedom is the recognition of necessity1 
Since 1950 the world population has multiplied more rapidly than ever before. In 1950 
there were 2.5 billion people on earth and in 2005 there were 6.5 billion. This number 
could rise by 2015 to more than 9 billion.2 In 1979 the human population was 
estimated to be approximately doubling in total every 36 years.3 This led some authors 
to conclude that "[t]he human population is already above the optimum size".4 This 
rapid growth results in severe ecological, psychological, political, economic and 
sociological ramifications5 and it may well be concluded that warnings of authors as 
far back as 1798 have (collectively) been neglected or ignored. Malthus for instance 
warned that the population must always be kept down to the means of subsistence.6 
John Stuart Mill7 allowed population control as one of the few exceptions to 
government non-interference. More recently, Hardin8 approaches the issue from the 
notion of the commons – a shared, finite resource (for instance water, forest land and 
                                        
 JA (Robbie) Robinson. B Iur LLB (PU for CHE) LLM (NWU) LLD (PU for CHE). Professor in the 
Faculty of Law, North-West University (Potchefstroom). Email: robbie.robinson@nwu.ac.za. My 
thanks to the South African National Research Foundation for its generous financial support that 
partly enabled this research. It goes without saying that all errors are my own. 
1 Hegel as per Hardin 1968 Science 1248. 
2  Population Reference Bureau 2015 http://goo.gl/nDJ4PF. 
3 Bolner and Jacobsen 1979 Loy L Rev 236. 
4 Ehrlich, Ehrlich and Holdren Ecoscience 738. 
5 See eg UN Population Debate. One contribution reads as follows: "[T)he population problem is too 
often defined in narrow ... terms of too many people pressing on inadequate food supplies. This 
is but one dimension of the problem ... (O)thers include pollution and the disruption of the earth's 
ecosystem, depletion of mineral and water resources, energy shortages, erosion, deforestation, 
expanding desserts, unemployment, overcrowded cities ... [N]o country is spared the impact of 
population growth ... for we all live on a shrinking planet." Italics added. 
6 Malthus An Essay on the Principle of Population xii referred to by Bolner and Jacobsen 1979 Loy L 
Rev 236. Malthus explained that the human population expands exponentially while the increase 
of means takes place arithmetically. The imbalance created by this state of affairs is corrected by 
either a "positive check" (famine, disease, war) or theoretically by a "preventative check" (sexual 
abstinence). See Kates 2004 Environmental Values 51. 
7 Riley Mill on Liberty 97. 
8 Hardin 1968 Science 1248. 
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air) in which the cost of an individual's use is borne by all while benefits accrue mostly 
to himself.9 He argues that freedom to procreate will bring ruin to all. 
Because individuals will continue exploiting the commons indefinitely, human beings 
always perceive an increase in personal benefits from additional exploitation to be 
greater than personal costs.10 Hardin concludes therefore that if means cannot be 
found to divide the ownership of the commons to hold the individual liable for the total 
cost of his actions, or if prohibitions cannot be imposed to inhibit exploitation, the 
commons will be destroyed. Applying this approach to the question of procreation he 
states that "[F]reedom to breed is intolerable … [t]o couple the concept of freedom 
to breed with the belief that everyone has an equal right to the commons is to lock 
the world into a tragic course of action."11 
Hardin's statement encapsulates the thesis for the current research – to what extent 
does the finite nature of the commons pose a limitation to the right to procreate? Can 
any choice and decision regarding the establishment and size of a family irrevocably 
rest with the family itself?12 It is clear that the proverb that every (English-)man's 
                                        
9 He explains his theory as follows: 
 [T)he tragedy of the commons develops in this way. Picture a pasture open to all. It is to be 
expected that each herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as possible on the commons. Such 
an arrangement may work reasonably satisfactorily for centuries because tribal wars, poaching, 
and disease keep the numbers of both man and beast well below the carrying capacity of the land. 
Finally, however, comes the day of reckoning, that is, the day when the long-desired goal of social 
stability becomes a reality. At this point, the inherent logic of the commons remorselessly 
generates tragedy. 
 As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximise his gain. Explicitly or implicitly, more or less 
consciously, he asks, "What is the utility to me of adding one more animal to my herd?" This utility 
has one negative and one positive component. 
 1. The positive component is a function of the increment of one animal. Since the herdsman 
receives all the proceeds from the sale of the additional animal, the positive utility is nearly +1 
2. The negative component is a function of the additional overgrazing created by one more animal. 
Since, however, the effects of overgrazing are shared by all the herdsmen, the negative utility for 
any particular decision making herdsman is only a fraction of -1. 
Adding together the component partial utilities, the rational herdsman concludes that the only 
sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal to his herd. And another ... But this is 
the conclusion reached by each and every rational herdsman sharing a commons. Therein is the 
tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit- in 
a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own 
best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons 
brings ruin to all. Italics added. 
10 Hardin 1968 Science 1247. 
11 Hardin 1968 Science 1246. See, also, Goodwin 2012 Macalester Journal of Philosophy 42. 
12 Thant International Planned Parenthood News 3 as quoted in Hardin 1968 Science 1247. 
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home is his castle may seriously be challenged by the protection and maintenance of 
the commons. 
This contribution will consider the issue from a South African point of view which, in 
essence, entails a study of section 36 of the Constitution. This section principally 
regulates the limitation of constitutionally entrenched rights. However, for the sake of 
completeness a more general background regarding the limitation of the right to 
procreate against the background of ecological factors and socio-economic factors will 
be provided in paragraph 2. 
2 Structuring of a social policy with regard to population control – a few 
introductory remarks 
It is trite that it is the duty of the State as protector of the common good to protect 
and maintain the commons.13 The situation may be complicated, though, as the State's 
responsibility to implement measures is multi-dimensional and often affected by the 
strong moral, cultural and religious values of various communities. It is suggested, 
however, that it can safely be taken as a point of departure that dwindling resources 
prima facie pose a situation where continued growth of the population ultimately 
cannot go on uncontrolled – "[i]n the very long run, continued growth of the ... 
population would first become intolerable and then physically impossible".14 This two-
pronged starting point raises a plethora of questions: Is it within the authority of the 
State to adopt social policies which lead to a limitation of population growth; what 
exactly is it that the State must protect – is it the survival and bare existence of the 
human species as such or is it a form of life qualified by ethical good (the quality of 
life);15 must the number of people be reduced or should other solutions be found to 
minimize the impact of the population on the commons; what means of "combating 
the threat" should be applied by the State; at what point has the size of the population 
made effective government impossible? These are but a few of the questions and 
issues that arise. It does not need any elaboration that these questions have definite 
                                        
13 See eg Munalula 2012 Theo Inq L 312. See too Goodwin 2012 Macalester Journal of Philosophy 
43. 
14 Golding and Golding 1970 Vand L Rev 496. 
15 See in this respect Golding and Golding 1970 Vand L Rev 495. 
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ecological and socio-economic underpinnings – water and food shortages and 
damaging of the environment (qua examples of the depletion of the commons) may 
be a direct, and sometimes are, a direct consequence of overpopulation. The question 
remains, then, whether limitations may be placed on the right to procreate because 
of socio-economic conditions and ecological factors. 
Kotzé considers sustainability as the point of departure to structure a social policy. 
Sustainability, according to him, is the balancing mechanism between the most basic 
(socio-economic) conditions of human existence on the one hand and ecological 
interests on the other16 - more of the one implies less of the other unless a compromise 
is found which affords equal importance to ecological, social and economic interests. 
It is not clear what is meant by "most basic (socio-economic) conditions". If it is meant 
that survival is threatened only if ecological interests threaten literally such most basic 
socio-economic conditions, it is suggested that the definition of sustainability is too 
narrow. It is further not clear what survival means. Would it be survival as reflected 
in the availability of the most basic socio-economic conditions of human existence? It 
appears that there is not sufficient clarity in the identification of the threat or how to 
address it. For instance, overcrowding certainly is a threat, but does this necessarily 
mean that the number of people must be reduced? It is suggested that the exact 
nature of the threat as well as what it is that is threatened must be identified also to 
reflect on the question whether overpopulation and dwindling resources may serve as 
a limitation to the right to procreate. It will be argued in paragraph 5 infra that clarity 
must be had on these issues before section 36 of the Constitution can be invoked. 
It is not altogether clear how to structure a social policy regarding population growth. 
This is largely due to the fact that there is no single body of received opinion that 
applies unconditionally. As the point of departure, though, it is accepted that the 
problem cannot simply be human survival or, put somewhat differently, the survival 
of the human species. It cannot be accepted unconditionally that the human species 
will not survive if the population were not limited; the species would survive even if 
                                        
16 Kotzé 2010 JHRE 136. 
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humans procreated freely. Many would die off but the species would survive.17 This 
leaves the question, then, what is it that needs to be protected? 
Arguing as they do that mere survival cannot be the justification for a social policy, 
Golding and Golding depart from the point that it is a form of ethical life that must be 
protected - it is "our" obligation "to promote what is good".18 To determine good in 
situations where a choice must be exercised, good is rarely a single good, but rather 
a cluster of goods. Every good has its own, legitimate appeal but all goods cannot be 
realised simultaneously and in the same degree. Different goods must therefore be 
ranked into relations of higher and lower when exercising a choice and even if it is not 
always clear where on a valuation scale a particular good finds itself, ranking 
nevertheless does take place. The authors provide19 the following example as a scale 
for ranking: Going from lower to higher life or survival takes the lowest position. 
Material goods, recreational pursuit, friendship, knowledge, love and "radiant virtue" 
then follow. Debate may ensue about where a specific good must be located and the 
estimation may vary due to one's disposition. 
Values do not only display a ranking in accordance with "valuational" height but also 
in accordance with "valuational" strength, in the sense that some may be stronger and 
some weaker. Friendship and love are higher on the valuation scale but a breach of 
friendship or an incapacity to love is not regarded as seriously as murder. Life 
(survival) is a stronger value and the deduction is made that the strength of a value 
is measured by the gravity of the violation against it – the good attendant upon the 
realization of a value is inversely proportional to the gravity of its violence.20 The 
position is explained as follows by Hartmann: 
The higher value is always the more conditioned, the more dependent and in this 
sense the weaker; its fulfilment is conceivable only in so far as it is raised upon the 
fulfilment of the lower values. But the more unconditioned, the more elementary, 
and in this sense the stronger value is always the lower; it is only a base for the 
                                        
17 Golding and Golding 1970 Vand L Rev 497. 
18 Golding and Golding 1970 Vand L Rev 496. 
19 Golding and Golding 1970 Vand L Rev 498. 
20 Golding and Golding 1970 Vand L Rev 498. The authors refer here to the work of Hartmann Ethics 
from 444-463. 
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moral life, not a fulfilment of its meaning ... [T]he greatest moral desert attaches to 
the highest values.21 
From this exposition Golding and Golding conclude that the very lowest values, 
particularly survival (life), have whatever value they have because they are conditions 
for the higher goods. The value of life is therefore derivative. This means that even 
though sight may never be lost of its importance, sheer survival should never be 
accepted unconditionally as the justification for a social policy. "[W]hat is at stake is 
not the survival of the species, but rather the survival, or realization, of a way of life."22 
How are values to be ranked when exercising a choice with regard to social policy? 
There is no ready answer. The hierarchy of the scale of values does not necessarily 
provide a resolution of conflicts within clusters of goods. A higher value should not 
ipso facto be preferred over a lower; this may be impossible. On the other hand it may 
be unworthy to prefer a lower value over a higher. Irrespective of these difficulties 
the uneasy synthesis of values that comprise the way of life or good that is sought to 
be preserved must be accurately identified to insure that the means employed to 
promote the way of life does not in the final instance destroy it. It is not sufficient to 
argue that the species will not survive if a specific means is not adopted. If the solution 
to a given situation requires that morality be fundamentally extended, it is likely that 
the new synthesis of values promoted by the solution will not embody the good that 
society by implication acknowledges, specifically if it involves according survival a 
higher rather than a derivative status. In the final instance what is sought is "[t]o 
promote the survival of a way of life that we consider good."23 
The detrimental effect of an over-populated earth is well documented and in this 
paragraph only a brief exposition of the state of the commons in South Africa will be 
provided. More specifically population growth and the exploitation of the environment 
for financial gain will be addressed. These are but two of the major contributors in a 
plethora of circumstances.24 Issues not referred to include, inter alia, cultural and 
                                        
21 Hartmann as referred to by Golding and Golding 1970 Vand L Rev 451-452. 
22 Golding and Golding 1970 Vand L Rev 498. 
23 Golding and Golding 1970 Vand L Rev 499. Italics added. 
24 See http://www.unfa.org/6billion/populationissues/development.htm (hereafter "population 
issues"). According to this source 20% of the world's people living in the world's higher income 
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religious issues25 and poor education. It goes without saying that these aspects can 
hardly be evaluated in isolation, as they are interrelated. 
According to 2011 census statistics the population of South Africa was 51,770,560 
people. This figure reflects a 767% growth from 1911. It is anticipated that in 2025 
the population will be 56,255,907.26 Females comprise approximately 51% of the 
population. 15,100,089 (29,2%) of the population falls in the 0-14 years category, 
22934,113 (44,3%) in the 15-39 category, 10,970,366 (21.2%) in the 40-64 category 
and 2,793,992 (5,4%) in the 65 and over category. The male population growth is 
higher since more males than females were born between 1991 and 2001, and more 
female than male deaths of people aged 20-29 have been recorded since 2000.27 The 
fertility rate of the South African population is declining. Whereas rates in regions such 
as Asia and Latin America have more than halved during the last 50 years, the rates 
in Sub-Saharan Africa remain high. The average total fertility rate in this region has 
                                        
countries are responsible for 86% of total private consumption compared with the poorest 20%, 
who account for only 1.3%. The richest 20% account for 53% of carbon dioxide emissions and 
the poorest 20% for 3%. A child born in the industrial world adds more to consumption and 
pollution levels in one lifetime than do 30-50 children born in developing countries. The authors 
warn that as living standards rise in developing countries the environmental consequences of 
population growth are amplified with ever-increasing numbers of people aspiring to "live better". 
Trends relating to the three "renewable" resources on which human life depends, namely water, 
air and land are becoming visible; eg 5-7 million hectares of agricultural lands are lost to 
accelerating land degradation and rapid urbanization every year; population growth in 2025 will 
lead to approximately 3 billion people in 48 countries being seriously affected by water shortages 
and rising sea levels because of C02 emissions, which will seriously disrupt agricultural production. 
See too Kates 2004 Environmental Values 51. 
25 In this respect, reference may be made to the contribution of Munalula 2012 Theo Inq L 312. She 
argues that the best interests of the child should be considered as the primary consideration in 
the decision to procreate. At 306 she notes that Africa is a continent that favours large families. 
Large families are often "[t]he result of a lack of interest in, or access to, family planning and 
sustained use of contraceptives. ... The need to procreate emanates from a combination of factors 
including patriarchal norms, customary law and religious prescriptions, extended family values and, 
ironically, poverty itself ... Many African people see in reproduction an opportunity to prove their 
masculinity or femininity and assure their posterity". At 311 she proceeds to explain that 
reproduction may increase the suffering caused by overpopulation – in this sense exercising a legal 
right may be morally wrong. A child has a right to responsible parenting; to bring a child into the 
world when he or she will be cruelly deprived of all or most of the basic goods of human life is not 
an act of parental responsibility. At 316 she concludes that African culture tends to favour large 
families (regardless of the individual's means) thereby promoting broad-based rights and 
responsibilities in the care and maintenance of children qua vulnerable members of society. 
Individual duties and responsibilities are obscured in the process. See also Goodwin 2012 
Macalester Journal of Philosophy 42; Orimoogunje et al 2011 IFE Psychologia 58. 
26 South African Institute of Race Relations South Africa Survey 2012 2. 
27 South African Institute of Race Relations South Africa Survey 2012 10. 
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exceeded 5.1 between 2005 and 2010. In South Africa the rate has dropped from 2.92 
in 2001 to 2.35 in 2011. This figure compares favourably with most African countries 
but appears to be higher than the international average. The birth rate has dropped 
from 26.1 in 2001 to 21 in 2011 and it is expected that it will drop further to 18 in 
2025. An interesting piece of information emerges in the "Births minus Deaths" 
category in that in 1985 the difference between deaths as a proportion of births added 
up to 24,4% while in 2011 this figure was 56,6%. It was anticipated that in 2025 this 
figure will be higher than 71,7% as the number of births will decrease while the 
number of deaths will increase. In the period 2001-2011 the percentage of women 
who are HIV-positive has risen from 17,4% to 19,4%. The social security budget 
reflects a change in social security expenditure from 1994 to 2014 of 1250%. Its 
proportion of total government expenditure is 15,8% and its proportion to the GDP 
4,8%. 
Information pertaining to housing proves the existence of a clear and constantly 
increasing demand for formal housing. The provision in this category increased by 
139,8% from 1996 to 2011 and in the informal housing category by 20,8%. With 
regard to the number of households, 86,1% of all households have access to free 
basic water. Free basic water comprises 6000 litres per household per month and is 
funded using local government revenue from appropriately structured water tariffs.28 
When looking at the figures and statistics in the previous paragraph it must 
immediately be stressed that population growth, even though it is declining, is still 
higher than the average. It is commonly accepted that lack of skills and inability to 
enter the job market and secure good employment stems from a poor education 
background and results, inter alia, in higher population growth figures.29 As such the 
population growth may be viewed as a symptom of poor education. However, its 
effects on the environment must still be evaluated. For the current purposes suffice it 
to evaluate the effect of the growth of the population on the water supply of the 
country. 
                                        
28 South African Institute of Race Relations South Africa Survey 2012 637. 
29 See eg Munalula 2012 Theo Inq L 313; Orimoogunje et al 2011 IFE Psychologia 58; Van Bogaert 
2005 SAMJ 32. 
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It speaks for itself that sustainable water provision is a critical component of the 
development of a society. In this respect South Africa faces severe challenges, since 
65% the country is semi-arid. In this area the average rainfall is 450 mm/year, which 
is well below the world average of 860 mm/year. The country's water resources are 
scarce and limited in extent. In fact, the country is categorised as water-stressed, with 
an annual fresh water availability of less than 1700 m3 per capita (the index for water 
stress). In fact, the current estimate is 1154 m3 per capita/year and it is estimated 
that in 2025 the country will be among the countries in the world that will physically 
experience water scarcity with an annual fresh water availability of less than 1000 m3 
per capita (the index for water scarcity). A further complicating aspect relates to the 
unevenness of water resources across the country, which is compounded by a strong 
seasonality of rainfall. It is expected that in 2025 several water management areas 
will experience severe water deficits. 
The demand for water is set to become a major concern. Already in 2004 Otieno and 
Ochieng commented on the position as follows: 
Water demand projections in South Africa indicate an annual growth rate of 1.5% 
between 1990 and 2005 with 3.5% predicted for urban and industrial use and 1% 
for irrigation. Despite the conventional demand sectors, a major but salient demand 
sector is the "productive uses" of water at household level and village based 
enterprises. This sector is predicted to more than double the water supply volume to 
become more demand responsive and sustainable. Water transfer from surplus to 
deficit areas is also increasing leading to reduced availability in the transfer area. 
With the increase in population coupled with increased human activities, the impact 
of organisations or individuals on the water quality in rivers, streams, groundwater 
and wetlands will make water unavailable through pollution. Deteriorating water 
quality is one of the major threats to South Africa's capability to provide sufficient 
water of appropriate quality to meet its needs and to ensure environmental 
sustainability. These conditions will put pressure on the already stressed water 
systems leading to a reduction in water availability, a situation likely to result in 
increase in conflicts over water affectation.30 
4 Brief consideration of the constitutional right to procreate and 
possible limitations to the right4.1 The right to privacy and dignity 
as fortification of the right to make decisions regarding reproduction 
                                        
30 Otieno and Ochieng "Water Management Tools" 121. Italics added. 
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Various provisions in the South African Bill of Rights enshrined in the Constitution 
contain prescripts which are relevant for the current discussion. They include section 
12(2), which provides for the right to bodily and psychological integrity and which 
includes the right to make decisions concerning reproduction and the right to security 
in, and control over, one's body; section 24(b), which entails the right to have the 
environment protected for the benefit of present and future generations; and section 
27(1)(b), which reads that everyone has the right to have access to sufficient food 
and water. The constitutional framework against which these provisions have to be 
understood, it is suggested, is to be found in the provisions in relation to privacy and 
dignity contained in sections 10 and 14 of the Constitution.31 The rights to privacy and 
dignity serve as fortification of the right to make decisions about reproduction.32 
Unlike almost all international instruments and some foreign constitutions,33 the South 
African Constitution34 does not contain a provision recognising the family as the basic 
unit of society. Neither is there any mention of the right freely to marry or to establish 
a family life.35 The Constitutional Court explains that this omission must be understood 
in the context of South Africa being a multi-cultural jurisdiction: 
The absence of marriage and family rights in many African and Asian countries 
reflects the multi-cultural and multi-faith character of such societies. Families are 
constituted, function and are dissolved in such a variety of ways, and the possible 
outcomes of constitutionalising family rights are so uncertain, that constitution-
makers appear frequently to prefer not to regard the right to marry or to pursue 
family life as a fundamental right that is appropriate for definition in constitutionalised 
terms. International experience accordingly suggests that a wide range of options on 
the subject would have been compatible with CP (constitutional principle) ll. On the 
one hand, the provisions of the NT (new text) would clearly prohibit any arbitrary 
State interference with the right to marry or to establish and raise a family. NT 7(1) 
                                        
31 Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 308, 522, 594. 
32 See S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 144; In re Certification of the Constitution of the 
RSA, 1996 1996 4 SA 744 (CC) para 96; Dawood, Shalabi and Thomas v Minister of Home Affairs 
2000 3 SA 936 (CC) para 28. 
33 See eg art 6(1) of the German Grundgesetz: "Ehe und Familie stehen unter dem besondern Schutze 
der staatlichen Ordnung". 
34 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
35 In re Certification of the Constitution of the RSA, 1996 1996 4 SA 744 (CC) para 96. Ss 12(2)(a) 
and (b) of the Constitution provides for the right to bodily and psychological integrity, which 
includes the right to make decisions regarding reproduction and the right to security in and control 
over one's body. 
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enshrines the values of human dignity, equality and freedom, while NT 10 states that 
everyone has the right to have their dignity respected and protected.36 
It is clear that the court considers the constitutional safeguards, despite the absence 
of clauses expressly protecting the right to family life, sufficient to meet the obligations 
imposed by international human rights law to protect the rights of persons freely to 
marry and raise a family. In Dawood, Shalabi and Thomas v Minister of Home Affairs 
the court explains that marriage and family are matters of defining significance for 
many if not most people.37 In particular the value of dignity in interpreting 
constitutional rights on the one hand and the right to dignity as enshrined in section 
10 of the Constitution on the other are of particular relevance. In Dawood the Court 
held that the right to dignity is the primary right under these circumstances. Prohibiting 
a marriage relationship or the raising of a family would "[i]mpair(s) the ability of the 
individual to achieve personal fulfilment in an aspect of life that is of central 
significance".38 The right is justiciable. As such it must be respected and protected, 
yet it may also be limited.39 
4.2 Scope of the rights to privacy and dignity 
The value of human dignity is safeguarded and promoted by the recognition of the 
right to dignity in the Bill of Rights. The central importance of this right was 
emphasised as follows by the Constitutional Court in Makwanyane:40 
The right to life and dignity are the most important of all human rights, and the 
source of all other personal rights in the Bill of Rights. By committing ourselves to a 
society founded on the recognition of human rights we are required to value these 
two rights above all others. 
                                        
36 In re Certification of the Constitution of the RSA, 1996 1996 4 SA 744 (CC) paras 99-104. Italics 
added. 
37 Dawood, Shalabi and Thomas v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 3 SA 936 (CC) 28. 
38  Italics added. 
39 Dawood, Shalabi and Thomas v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 3 SA 936 (CC) paras 35-37; Booysen 
v Minister of Home Affairs 2001 4 SA 48S (CC). This much is clear from Dawood, Shalabi and 
Thomas v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 3 SA 936 (CC) para 36. The applicants in casu argued 
that legislation interfering with the right to enter into marriage relationships infringed various 
constitutionally entrenched rights. The court held, however, that the primary right implicated under 
these circumstances is the right to dignity. 
40 S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 144. 
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The right to privacy enshrined in section 14 of the Constitution serves to protect and 
foster the right to dignity.41 The section provides that everyone has the right to privacy 
and has on several occasions enjoyed the attention of the Constitutional Court. In 
Bernstein v Bester42 the Court remarked as follows: 
The concept of privacy is an amorphous and elusive one ... The scope of privacy has 
been closely related to the concept of identity and it has been stated that "rights, like 
the right to privacy, are not based on a notion of the unencumbered self, but on the 
notion of what is necessary to have one's own autonomous identity. ..." The truism 
that no right is to be considered absolute implies that from the outset of interpretation 
each right is always already limited by every other right accruing to another citizen. 
In the context of privacy this would mean that it is only the inner sanctum of a person, 
such as his/her family life, sexual preference and home environment, which is 
shielded from erosion by conflicting rights of the community. This implies that 
community rights and rights of fellow members place a corresponding obligation on 
a citizen, thereby shaping the abstract notion of individualism towards identifying a 
concrete member of civil society. Privacy is acknowledged in the truly personal realm, 
but as a person moves into communal relations and activities such as business and 
social interaction, the scope of personal space shrinks accordingly. 
The exposition of the Court makes it clear that in the "[t]ruly personal realm" an 
expectation of privacy is more likely to be considered reasonable than such an 
expectation in the context of "[c]ommunal relations and activities".43 In fact, the Court 
proceeds by approvingly referring to the German Grundgesetz. Unlike the position in 
South Africa the Grundgesetz does not entrench a general right to privacy, although 
isolated aspects of privacy (freedom of belief, protection of postal communications 
and inviolability of the home) are protected. The Court concludes that a very high level 
of protection is given to the individual's intimate personal sphere of life and the 
maintenance of its basic preconditions. Ultimately, however, there is a final sphere of 
human freedom that is untouchable and beyond interference from any public 
authority. In this most intimate core of privacy no limitation thereof is permitted. 
However, this intimate core is narrowly construed and "[i]s left behind when an 
individual enters into relationships with persons outside this closest intimate sphere; 
                                        
41 S v Jordan 2002 6 SA 642 (CC) para 81. In casu the Court found that a prohibition on commercial 
sex does not encroach upon intimate or meaningful relationships. 
42 Bernstein v Bester 1996 2 SA 751 (CC) paras 65-67. Italics added. 
43 Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 318. 
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the individual's activities then acquire a social dimension and the right of privacy in 
this context becomes subject to limitation".44 
It may provisionally be concluded that prima facie the inner sanctum would cover the 
decision to reproduce so that the individual would remain the final arbiter of his/her 
decisions in this respect. However, the question may well be raised whether 
circumstances such as over-population and the depletion of resources do not reflect a 
social dimension to the right to make decisions concerning reproduction which may 
indeed render it possible to limit the exercising of the right. In other words, does the 
welfare of society/do the interests of the State remove the location of the right down 
the continuum, rendering it legally possible to be limited? In S v Jordan45 the 
Constitutional Court elaborated to some extent on this matter. Whereas the issue 
before the Court in Bernstein related to an examination of the respondents in terms 
of the Companies Act,46 the facts in Jordan dealt with provisions of the Sexual Offences 
Act47 which made it an offence to have unlawful carnal intercourse or commit an act 
of indecency for reward. The issue raised by these facts is of course where to locate 
acts of prostitution on the continuum of privacy interests, as it is a combination of the 
intimacy of an act of a sexual nature and of an impersonal cash transaction. 
In casu the Court found that in its very essence prostitution is indiscriminate and 
loveless. Consequently it is not the form of intimate sexual expression that is penalised 
by criminal law but rather that the sex is indiscriminate and for reward. The sex worker 
"[i]s not nurturing relationships or taking life affirming decisions about birth, marriage 
or family; she is making money".48 It is therefore clear that the act of prostitution 
                                        
44 Bernstein v Bester 1996 2 SA 751 (CC) para 77. In Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic 
Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd: In re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit 
2001 1 SA 545 (CC) the Court explains that privacy is a right which becomes more intense the 
closer it moves to the intimate personal sphere of the life of human beings, and less intense as it 
moves away from that core. It concludes that the level of justification for a limitation of the right 
must be evaluated on an ad hoc basis in the light of all relevant circumstances of each case. 
"[R]elevant circumstances would include whether the subject of the limitation is a natural or a 
juristic person as well as the nature and effect of the invasion of privacy" (para 18). 
45 S v Jordan 2002 6 SA 642 (CC). 
46  Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
47  Sexual Offences Act 23 of 1957. 
48 S v Jordan 2002 6 SA 642 (CC) para 83. 
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places her far away from the inner sanctum of projected privacy rights.49 However, 
even though it is less difficult for the State to establish that the limitation is justifiable, 
the suppression of commercial sex cannot be justified merely on the basis of enforcing 
a particular view of morality. Reasons advanced by the State to justify such 
suppression therefore include that prostitution in itself is degrading to women; that it 
is conducive to violent abuse of prostitutes by both customers and pimps; that it is 
associated with, and encourages international trafficking in women; that it leads to 
child prostitution; that it carries an intensified risk of the spread of sexually transmitted 
diseases; that it goes hand in hand with high degrees of drug abuse; that it has close 
connections with other crimes; and that it is a frequent and persistent cause of public 
nuisance.50 The Court consequently points out that there is a strong public interest in 
the regulation of prostitution in a manner which will foster the achievement of equality 
between men and women.51 
4.3 The right to make decisions about reproduction enshrined in section 
12(2)(a) of the Constitution 
Section 12(2) stipulates that everyone has the right to bodily and psychological 
integrity, which includes the right, inter alia, to make decisions concerning 
reproduction. The inclusion of this right serves as a recognition that the power to make 
decisions about reproduction is a crucial aspect of control over one's body.52 It is 
suggested that the interpretation of this right to a substantial extent stems from the 
right to privacy and in fact appears to be bearing out on it. It comes as no surprise, 
therefore, that there is little case law on the particular provision. In Christian Lawyers 
Association v Minister of Health53 the court had the opportunity, though, to deal with 
the matter in an application to strike down some provisions of the Choice on 
Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996. It approached the matter from the 
perspective of the right of a woman to determine the fate of her own pregnancy.54 
                                        
49 S v Jordan 2002 6 SA 642 (CC) para 83. 
50 S v Jordan 2002 6 SA 642 (CC) para 86. 
51 S v Jordan 2002 6 SA 642 (CC) para 93. 
52 Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 308. 
53 Christian Lawyers Association v Minister of Health 2005 1 SA 509 (TPD). 
54 Christian Lawyers Association v Minister of Health 2005 1 SA 509 (TPD) 521G. 
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The court argues that section 12(2)(a) affords everyone in explicit language the right 
to bodily integrity, which includes the right to make decisions concerning reproduction. 
This provision clearly includes the right to choose whether or not to terminate a 
pregnancy. This constitutional right is reinforced by various other rights enshrined in 
the Bill of Rights, including the inherent right to dignity, to have one's dignity respected 
and protected, the right to privacy and the right to have access to reproductive health 
care.55 A strong basis for the right to the termination of pregnancy is provided by the 
cumulative effect of the specific provision in section 12(2)(a) as reinforced by other 
constitutional rights.56 
From this perspective it is clear that the State may not unduly interfere with a woman's 
right to terminate her pregnancy. However, as with all other constitutional rights, the 
Court concludes that the right to the termination of pregnancy is not absolute. 
The state has a legitimate role, in the protection of pre-natal life as an important 
value in our society, to regulate and limit the woman's right to choose in that regard. 
However, because the right itself is derived from the Constitution the regulation 
thereof by the state may amount to the denial of that right. Similarly any limitation 
of the right constitutes a limitation of a woman's fundamental right and is therefore 
valid only to the extent that such limitation is justifiable57 in an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.58 
The question arises what the true nature of the right to decisions concerning 
reproduction entails – what exactly is it that is constitutionally protected? Phrased 
somewhat differently, what falls in the "[t]ruly personal realm" or "inner sanctum" 
(Bernstein)? It is suggested that a proper reading of section 12(2) makes it abundantly 
clear that it is not the act of sexual intercourse. The exposition in Jordan conveys that 
sex may indeed have a social dimension when, for instance, it is for commercial 
purposes. Other factors may also be indicative of such a social dimension and it is 
argued that commercial purposes do not form a numerus clausus of limitations. What 
does fall in the inner sanctum, it is submitted, is the decision concerning reproduction. 
                                        
55 Christian Lawyers Association v Minister of Health 2005 1 SA 509 (TPD) 527A. 
56 Christian Lawyers Association v Minister of Health 2005 1 SA 509 (TPD) 527B. 
57 In S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) the Constitutional Court indicated the general approach 
towards the interpretation of s 36 of the Constitution. See the text to para 3.1 above. 
58 Christian Lawyers Association v Minister of Health 2005 1 SA 509 (TPD) 527D-F. See para 4.41 
for a discussion of s 36(2) of the Constitution. 
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It is suggested that as such it has to be considered similarly, for instance, to the right 
to religious freedom. 
Prima facie the right to make decisions concerning reproduction is couched in similar 
terms as the constitutional right to religious freedom – "[E]veryone has the right to 
freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion."59 In Prince v President, 
Cape Law Society60 the Constitutional Court explained the nature of the right to 
religious freedom as follows: 
[t]he right to freedom of religion at least comprehends: (a) the right to entertain the 
religious beliefs that one chooses to entertain; (b) the right to announce one's 
religious beliefs publicly and without fear of reprisal; and (c) the right to manifest 
such beliefs by worship and practice, teaching and dissemination.61 
Freedom of religion therefore has a distinct individual and collective dimension.62 It is 
considered that only the entertaining of religious beliefs would fall in the inner sanctum 
or truly personal realm. Announcing such beliefs publicly and manifesting such beliefs 
openly on the other hand are activities which place the right to freedom of religion in 
the public domain. Limitations on the right to freedom of religion are provided for in 
section 31(2) of the Constitution in that the rights to practise one's religion and to 
form, join and maintain associations may not be exercised in a manner inconsistent 
with any provision of the Bill of Rights. It is therefore clear that it is the collective 
dimension of the right to freedom of religion that is constitutionally limited. The 
entertaining of religious beliefs would fall in the truly personal realm, in terms of which 
an expectation of privacy is more likely to be considered reasonable than such an 
expectation in the context of "[c]ommunal relations and activities".63 
A brief exposition of section 24(b) 
It is submitted that sections 24(b) and 27(1)(b) must be read together and also 
together with section 12(2)(a) in terms of the so-called principle of interdependency 
                                        
59 S 15(1) of the Constitution. 
60 Prince v President, Cape Law Society 2002 2 SA 794 (CC) para 38. 
61 See also S v Lawrence 1997 4 SA 1176 (CC) para 92. Furthermore, even though it is very important 
for the subject, no attention will be paid to the debate regarding abortion. 
62 See eg Christian Lawyers Association v Minister of Health 2005 1 SA 509 (TPD) para 19. 
63 See the text accompanying n 40 above. 
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of rights. By their very nature sections 24(b) and 27(1)(b) do not only contain 
constitutionally protected rights but indeed also by implication provide for the 
possibility of justifiable limitations of the right to decide about reproduction. Section 
24(b) provides that everyone has the right to have the environment protected, "[f]or 
the benefit of present and future generations, through reasonable legislative and other 
measures that ... (ii) promote conservation and (iii) secure ecologically sustainable 
development and use of natural resources while promoting justifiable economic and 
social development."64 Section 27(1)(b) reads that everyone has the right to have 
access to sufficient food and water and must be read in conjunction with section 
24(b).65 
From the wording of the section it is clear that by including environmental rights as 
justiciable, constitutionally protected rights the State requires that environmental 
considerations be accorded appropriate recognition in the administrative process.66 By 
necessary implication this means that all government action and legislation must 
comply with the constitutional right to a healthy environment.67 Currie and De Waal 
further suggest that in view of the fact that negative environmental impacts are often 
not restricted to individuals but also profoundly affect groups of people, individuals 
may exercise this right collectively.68 The authors point out that qua constitutional 
right section 24(b) must also be read with section 8, which in essence means that it 
is not only the State that is bound by individual constitutional rights, but that 
individuals may now also assert their constitutional rights directly against others - the 
so-called direct horizontal application of the Constitution.69 
                                        
64  Italics added. 
65 One may refer in this respect to the so-called principle of the interdependency of rights, which requires 
that fundamental rights must be interpreted in such a way that they reinforce and complement one 
another. When interpreting s 24(b) of the Constitution regard should therefore be had to other 
fundamental rights such as the rights to equality, life, dignity etc. See too Goodwin 2012 Macalester 
Journal of Philosophy 47 for an explanation of the protection of the ecological rights of future 
generations. 
66 Director: Mineral Development, Gauteng Region v Save the Vaal Environment 1999 2 SA 709 (SCA) 
para 20. 
67 Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 522. 
68 Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 522. 
69 At Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 524 the authors express the opinion that s 24(b) 
o f  the  Const i tut ion  is unlikely to have direct horizontal application, as the subsection requires 
the State to take legislative and other steps to protect the environment. It imposes obligations 
only on the State and not on individuals. 
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The National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 provides a comprehensive 
definition of the environment. In terms of this definition the "environment" is the 
surroundings within which people exist, which are made up of: 
 the land, water and atmosphere of the earth; 
 micro-organisms, plant and animal life; 
 any part or combination of the first mentioned two aspects and the 
interrelationships among and between them; and 
 the physical, chemical, aesthetic and cultural properties and conditions of the 
foregoing that influence human life and well-being. 
This anthropocentric approach to the environment reflects a clear recognition of the 
impact the environment has on human beings. The term environment should 
consequently not be limited to the non-human natural environment but must be 
defined broadly so as to include both the relationship between human beings inter se 
and people and the environment. Currie and De Waal suggest that such a wider 
definition of environment would incorporate both the socio-economic and the cultural 
dimensions of these interrelationships.70 In BP Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v MEC for 
Agriculture, Conservation, Environment and Land Affairs71 the Court elaborated 
comprehensively on the nature of the right. As its point of departure it takes the well-
known dictum in King v Dykes72 where it was explained that the idea that prevailed in 
the past that ownership of land conferred the right on the owner to use his land as he 
pleased was giving way to a more responsible approach that an owner may not use 
his land in a way prejudicial to his neighbours or the community and that he holds the 
land in trust for future generations. One of the recurring legal elements of ecological 
sustainable development is therefore the need to preserve natural systems for the 
benefit of future generations.73 This approach bears on section 1(1) of the National 
Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998, which defines sustainable development 
                                        
70 Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 525. 
71 BP Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Agriculture, Conservation, Environment and Land Affairs 
2004 5 SA 124 (W) 151. 
72 King v Dykes 1971 3 SA 540 (RA) 545G-H. 
73 BP Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Agriculture, Conservation, Environment and Land Affairs 
2004 5 SA 124 (W) 143. 
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as the integration of social and environmental factors into planning, implementation 
and decision-making so as to ensure that development serves "[p]resent and future 
generations". 
The nature of the State's duty in terms of section 24(b) is a positive one. This goal 
must be achieved by legislation and administrative measures which include inter alia 
the securing of ecologically sustainable development and the use of natural resources 
while promoting justifiable economic and social development. 
4.4 Limitation of constitutionally entrenched rights – general background 
It is trite that constitutional rights may be limited; no right applies without limits. 
Section 8(1) of the Bill of Rights provides that the Bill applies to all law and that it 
binds the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs of State. This provision 
is self-explanatory, and suffice it to note that "law" in this section has to be broadly 
interpreted so as to include statutory law, common law and also customary law. 
Section 36(2) provides that the limitation of a constitutionally entrenched right must 
comply with the prescriptions of section 36(1) or with the dictates of any other 
provision of the Constitution. In terms of section 36(1) the limitation of a 
constitutionally protected right must adhere to the following requirements: 
 the limitation must be sanctioned by law of general application; 
 must be reasonable; and 
 must be justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality 
and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including the nature of the right, 
the importance of the purpose of the limitation, the nature and extent of the limitation, 
the relation between the limitation and its purpose, and also the availability of less 
restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
Section 36 in essence provides for a two-stage approach to the question of the 
limitation of a constitutional right: Has such a right been infringed by law or the 
conduct of another person and, depending on a positive answer, can the infringement 
be justified as a permissible limitation of the right? It needs no further illumination 
that a statutory provision to the effect that procreation be limited would constitute an 
infringement of this right. The reasonableness of such a limitation must then be 
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established. In this respect it is important to note that a court will not determine in 
the abstract whether the limitation is justifiable in an open and democratic society. On 
the contrary, evidence about the impact, for instance sociological evidence or 
statistical data about the impact of such a legislative restriction on society, must be 
presented.74 Where justification rests on policy or factual considerations, such must 
be put before the court. Failure to do so may lead to a deduction that the limitation is 
not justifiable.75 
Certain definite requirements pertaining to the limitation of constitutional rights have 
developed: 
 Law of general application includes legislation, delegated legislation and the South 
African common law. To qualify as "law" under this rubric, a rule of these sources must 
be accessible, precise and of general application. 
 The requirement of reasonableness and justifiability has given rise to a substantial 
body of jurisprudence. In essence the requirement of reasonableness is aimed at 
ensuring that a law should not invade a right any further than it needs in order to 
achieve its purpose. The requirement conveys that it must be shown that the particular 
law serves a constitutionally acceptable purpose and that there is sufficient 
proportionality between the infringement of the fundamental right in question and the 
benefit it is designed to achieve. 
The requirement of reasonableness was held to mean that a law or action limiting a 
right must have a reasonable goal and also that the means for achieving that goal 
must be reasonable.76 In S v Makwanyane77 the Constitutional Court explained the 
position as follows: 
                                        
74 See eg S v Meaker 1998 8 BCLR 1038 (W), where the court held at 1047A-G that it is not necessarily 
required that vast amounts of sources to substantiate an argument be put before a court. A 
"common sense analysis" of the purpose and need for legislation and of the "social and economic" 
milieu giving rise to the legislations would be sufficient. 
75 Phillips v Director of Public Prosecutions 2003 3 SA 345 (CC) para [20]. 
76 See eg Coetzee v Government of the Republic of South Africa 1995 4 SA 631 (CC). 
77 S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 104. In S v Bhulwana 1996 1 SA 388 (CC) the court 
explains the position graphically as follows: "In sum, therefore, the Court places the purpose, 
effects and importance of the infringing legislation on one side of the scales and the nature and 
effect of the infringement caused by the legislation on the other. The more substantial the inroad 
into fundamental rights, the more persuasive the grounds of justification must be." (para 18). 
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The limitation of constitutional rights for a purpose that is reasonable and necessary 
in a democratic society involves the weighing up of competing values and ultimately 
an assessment based on proportionality. ... The fact that different rights have 
different implications for democracy and, in the case of our Constitution, for "an open 
and democratic society based on freedom and equality", means that there is no 
absolute standard which can be laid down for determining reasonableness and 
necessity. Principles can be established, but the application of those principles to 
particular circumstances can only be done on a case-by-case basis. This is inherent 
in the requirement of proportionality which calls for the balancing of different 
interests. In the balancing process the relevant considerations will include the nature 
of the right that is limited and its importance to an open and democratic society 
based on freedom and equality; the purpose for which the right is limited and the 
importance of that purpose to such a society; the extent of the limitation, its efficacy 
and, particularly where the limitation has to be necessary, whether the desired ends 
could reasonably be achieved through other means less damaging to the right in 
question. 
This cautious approach was echoed later in a number of decisions. In S v Manamela78 
the Court explained that it has to engage in a balancing exercise and arrive at a global 
judgment on proportionality. It is not to adhere mechanically to a sequential checklist. 
As a general rule, however, the more serious the impact of the measure on the right, 
the more persuasive or compelling the justification must be. Ultimately the question 
is one of degree, to be assessed in the concrete and legislative and social setting of 
the measure, paying due regard to the means which are realistically available in the 
country but without losing sight of the ultimate values to be protected.79 
The nature of the right is of particular relevance. Most of the constitutionally 
entrenched rights are textually unqualified. The provision in section 11 that everyone 
has the right to life is, for example, not textually qualified and the only limitations 
placed on it are those imposed by section 36. However, the scope of some of the 
rights contained in the Bill is qualified by language that specifically demarcates their 
application. Section 12(2) of the Bill indeed serves as an example in point – the right 
to freedom of religion is limited by the provisions of section 31 in the sense that it 
may not be exercised in a manner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights. 
In similar fashion section 17 provides for the right to assemble, demonstrate, picket 
                                        
78 S v Manamela 2000 3 SA 1 (CC). 
79 See, also, Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 2000 4 SA 757 (CC) paras [29]-
[35]. 
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and petition but stipulates that such assembly must take place peacefully and 
unarmed.80 
It would appear that practical measures to effect population control will in view of the 
provisions of the Constitution be extremely difficult to implement. In this respect 
reference may be made to the so-called jihua shengyu or one-child-per-couple policy 
of the People's Republic of China. The idea of birth control was introduced as early as 
in the 1950s, when it became clear that the rapid population growth posed a potential 
threat to the economic development and food surplus in China.81 Initially the approach 
was to "propagandize and popularize" birth control in densely populated areas, and 
this decision was followed by a propaganda campaign promoting late marriage and 
having two children only. However, the implementation of birth control policy was 
gradually transferred from a voluntary-based birth planning programme to a state-
based control of population growth. Two steps were taken to promote population 
control. The first was the so-called "later, longer, fewer" campaign, which focused on 
extending contraceptive and abortion services into rural areas, longer intervals 
between births, and smaller families. The one-child policy took effect in 1979 when 
the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and the State Council's Resolution 
Concerning the Strengthening of Birth Control and Strictly Controlling Population 
Growth announced that: 
The State advocates that one couple has only one child. Except for special cases, 
with approval for second birth, government officials, workers and urban residents can 
only have one child for each couple. In rural areas, the State also advocates that 
each couple has only one child. However, with approval, those who have real 
difficulties can have their second child, several years after the birth of the first.82 
People were encouraged to have only one child through financial and material 
incentives such as paid pregnancy, leave for up to three years, a 5-10% salary increase 
and preferential access to housing, schools and health services. Couples having a 
                                        
80 See Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 186. Other sections referred to include ss 16 of 
the Constitution (that the right to freedom of expression does not extend to advocacy of hatred 
that is based on ethnicity etc) and 31 (which provides that the rights of cultural, religious and 
linguistic communities may not be exercised in a manner inconsistent with any other right 
contained in the Bill). 
81 Settles and Sheng "The One-child Policy" 1. 
82 Settles and Sheng "The One-child Policy" 2. 
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second child were excluded from these benefits and suffered financial penalties such 
as financial levies on each additional child and sanctions which ranged from social 
pressure to curtailed career prospects in government jobs. Urban couples were 
persuaded more easily, but rural families were difficult to convince. Peasants with 
limited savings and without government pensions effectively still needed their children 
to support them in old age. Traditionally a married daughter would move into her 
husband's family home and lineage. A son was therefore essential to meet the 
demands of labour on farms and related businesses. Social control in the rural areas 
was weakened by the collapse of the old commune system due to the post-Mao 
economic reform. Local authorities were therefore forced to rely on fines to discourage 
higher order births and they embarked upon stringent birth control campaigns. Many 
women were consequently bullied into abortion and sterilisation. Since 1985 a 
softening of policy and a relaxing of the requirements to permit a second child have 
occurred. By 2001 a second birth was permitted if the first child in rural areas was a 
girl, if the couple were only children, or if the only child was disabled. 
The one-child policy was successful in achieving the goals it was meant to achieve. It 
slowed down the population growth from 11.6% in 1979 to 5.9% in 2005. It reduced 
the population by an estimated 250-300 million people and the fertility rate fell from 
2.8 in 1979 to 1.8 in 2001. In urban areas such as Beijing more than 95% of children 
are only children. In 2002 China adopted its first Population and Family Planning Law 
in which birth control is set out as fundamental State policy. The attachment of 
subsistence income, the use of physical force and the confiscation of property to 
pursue population goals are now formally banned. Fines for out-of-plan births are 
replaced by a "social compensation fee" which ranges from 10% of one's annual 
income in poor rural areas to three to seven times one's income in some urban areas.83 
The one-child policy has had severe unintended impacts on the social and economic 
situation in China. These include inter alia an unbalanced gender ratio as well as an 
unbalanced urban-rural ratio of newborns. It is the unbalanced gender ratio especially 
                                        
83 Settles and Sheng "The One-child Policy" 5. See, also, Nakra 2012 World Future Review 134. The 
author notes that China's National Population and Family Planning Commission announced in 2006 
that the policy had helped to prevent 400 million births since its inception. 
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that has been severely criticized, since it was inevitably bound to lead to discrimination 
against female new-borns, who are aborted, abandoned, or unregistered, and are 
most likely to have disadvantaged status in matters of health care and education.84 
It needs no further explanation that similar measures would have serious 
consequences in South Africa. The measures adopted by the Chinese would clearly 
infringe many if not all the rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights. 
5 Conclusion 
The limitation of the constitutional right to make decisions concerning reproduction is 
bound to be controversial. It is therefore important that a clear mind must address 
the question of why such limitation is required. Mere survival cannot serve as the 
justification for a social policy to this effect – rather, it is ethical life or whatever may 
be described as being good that must be protected. The exposition of the situation in 
China in paragraph 3.4 shows that such an ethical life must be accurately identified to 
insure that the means to be employed will not ultimately destroy it. It would appear, 
though, that the state of the commons in South Africa is poor. The 767% growth in 
population in the period 1911-2011 and the scarcity and serious deterioration of the 
quality of water bear on the worrisome situation. In fact, these factors serve as 
indicators that social policy in respect of population growth should be pro-active and 
that it may indeed be justified to limit constitutionally entrenched rights in this 
respect.85 
The inner sanctum of the individual is shielded "[f]rom erosion by conflicting rights of 
the community".86 However, in similar vein as the right to religious freedom, it would 
appear that the right enshrined in section 12(2) of the Constitution relates to decisions 
regarding reproduction – that constitutes the inner-sanctum that may not be eroded. 
The outward manifestation of the right (procreation), however, reflects an aspect of 
                                        
84 See Settles and Sheng "The One-child Policy" 6 for a comprehensive discussion of the negative 
consequences of the one-child policy. 
85 S v Meaker 1998 8 BCLR 1038 (W) 1047; Phillips v Director of Public Prosecutions 2003 3 SA 345 
(CC) para [20]. 
86 Bernstein v Bester 1996 2 SA 751 (CC) para 66. 
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the right that may be subject to limitation. This much is clear from the discussion in S 
v Jordan.87 
Section 36 in the final instance requires that any limitation must be justifiable in an 
open and democratic society and must reflect, inter alia, a less restrictive means to 
achieve the required purpose.88 The multiple negative consequences pertaining to the 
Chinese one-child policy bear testimony to the wisdom of this provision. It is suggested 
that positive measures, for instance the provision of proper education and social 
provision rather than negative measures (the withholding of benefits or taxation) 
should be considered. The continued existence of the state may depend on the 
implementation of such measures.89 
Ultimately, the wealth of a nation in the modern world does not come from the ground, 
or the forests, or even its other natural resources. Instead it resides in the health and 
well-being of its people. It is time ... to rethink ... human development strategy. The 
very first step in building a viable humane society would be to develop a viable 
universal national pension plan, along with social and health-care programs (sic!) to 
protect people from cradle to grave.90  
                                        
87 See the text accompanying n 42 above. 
88 See S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para [104] as well as the exposition of the position in 
China in the previous paragraph. 
89 In this respect it is suggested that the application of the so-called theory of public subjective rights 
may be considered. See eg Robinson 2013 PELJ 148-205. 
90 Nakra 2012 World Future Review 139. Italics added. 
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